| From: |
| Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> |
| To: |
| linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com |
| Subject: |
| [PATCH v3 0/7] Inode security label invalidation |
| Date: |
| Mon, 26 Oct 2015 22:15:21 +0100 |
| Message-ID: |
| <1445894128-6765-1-git-send-email-agruenba@redhat.com> |
| Cc: |
| Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> |
| Archive‑link: | |
Article |
Here is another version of the patch queue to make gfs2 and similar file
systems work with SELinux. As suggested by Stephen Smalley [*], the relevant
uses of inode->security are wrapped in function calls that try to revalidate
invalid labels.
[*] http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=144416710207686&...
The patches are looking good from my point of view; is there anything else that
needs addressing?
Does SELinux have test suites that these patches could be tested agains?
Thanks,
Andreas
Andreas Gruenbacher (7):
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
selinux: Get rid of file_path_has_perm
selinux: Push dentry down from {dentry,path,file}_has_perm
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
gfs2: Invalide security labels of inodes when they go invalid
fs/gfs2/glops.c | 2 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++
include/linux/security.h | 5 +
security/security.c | 8 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++
6 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
--
2.5.0
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