Talking Smack for Tizen security

I know you wish there was nothing here to see, but since you've brought up some things that demand a response:

If I didn't pioneer actual layered security in the way in which it will be done in the future on host systems, then who did? I mean, there is a reason why you're talking about grsecurity in that 2004 article and not something else, isn't there? ;)

Anyone can read your blog and see what you're pushing in public (just look at the top 3 tags here: http://securityblog.org/tags.html). It's quite clear it's SELinux. Now if you're saying you're also pushing (via advocacy I guess, since you've done no research/work in this field) kernel self-protection as a necessary prerequisite for any form of mandatory access control, then I'm glad to hear you're advocating the use of grsecurity in private, as we've been the only name in the game since 2003.

I'm quite content being someone actually producing useful code to solve real problems, speaking up against the status quo, liars, charlatans, and shills. I trust history will look back on that more favorably than someone pushing the over-complicated SELinux for the past 10 years because his previous employer put itself forth as the only people knowledgeable enough to develop SELinux policies (I recall very well this being said at LSS 2010). Curious coming from someone who claims to understand the proper role of access control in overall security, seething with pride here in this thread that his SELinux has more useless knobs than Smack.

-Brad